The art of Man

[Cole]

Been working on exam study guide and reading Kant’s third critique and found §43 “On Art in General” to perhaps presage Marx’s alienated labor. Kant states..

(3) Art is likewise distinguished from craft. The first is also called free art, the second could also be called mercenary art. We regard free art [as an art] that could only turn out purposive (i.e., succeed) if it is play, in other words, an occupation that is agreeable on its own account; mercenary art we regard as labor, i.e., as an occupation that on its own account is disagreeable (burdensome) and that attracts us only through its effect (e.g., pay), so that people can be coerced into it. To judge whether, in a ranking of the guilds, watchmakers should be counted as artists but smiths as craftsmen, we would have to take a viewpoint different from the one adopted here: we would have to compare [Proportion] the talents that each of these occupations presupposes. Whether even among the so-called seven free arts a few may not have been included that should be numbered with the sciences, as well as some that are comparable to crafts, I do not here wish to discuss. It is advisable, however, to remind ourselves that in all the free arts there is yet a need for something in the order of a constraint, or, as it is called, a mechanism. (In poetry, for example, it is correctness and richness of language, as well as prosody and meter.) Without this the spirit,36 which in art must be free and which alone animates the work, would have no body at all and would evaporate completely. This reminder is needed because some of the more recent educators believe that they promote a free art best if they remove all constraint from it and convert it from labor into mere play.

Continuing along Marx into from this becomes interesting in regards to Fromm’s notion of spontaneity in our excerpt “sanity”..

“Spontaneous activity is free activity of the self and implies, psychologically, what the Latin root of the word, sponte, means literally: of one’s free will. By activity we do not mean “doing something,” but the quality of creative activity that can operate in one’s emotional, intellectual, and sensuous experiences and in one’s will as well. One premise for this spontaneity is the acceptance of the total personality and the elimination of the split between “reason” and “nature”; for only if man does not repress essential parts of his self, only if he has become transparent to himself, and only if the different spheres of life have reached a fundamental integration, is spontaneous activity possible.”

Kant appears to be trying to use the critique of the power of judgment to do just this, link nature and reason and its moral ideas. However in this linkage Kant will posit the subjective universality of form, the purposiveness without purpose as the principle of such. This backs his demands that free play not be totally free, it is still constrained by form or mechanism. With this in mind Fromm seems to first agree agree with Kant stating

“In the first place, we know of individuals who are – or have been – spontaneous, whose thinking, feeling, and acting were the expression of their selves and not of an automaton. These individuals are mostly known to us as artists. As a matter of fact, the artist can be defined as an individual who can express himself spontaneously”

In this way the artist is the quintessential realization of the path to realizing the purpose of reason in nature presented as possible through feeling of formal fittedness of nature to be possibly molded so. But in counter distinction Fromm goes on to also posit the child

“Small children offer another instance of spontaneity. They have an ability to feel and think that which is really theirs; this spontaneity shows in what they say and think, in the feelings that are expressed in their faces.”

To my understanding though, the child at minimum lacks the rational ability for their thoughts to be truly theirs. I think the notion of the “I” develops past the point, and often entails the demise of the child’s free expression Fromm seems to reference (often most easily seen in the child’s loss of the ability to dance, incredibly sad the day they cease to dance and look around the room with anxiety) In this manner Fromm’s notion of spontaneity must be different from Kant’s or he is positing two things. It would seem that Fromm’s authenticity posits constraint as merely external but Kant suggests its baked in and reconciling with it not removal is foundational to spontaneity. For both, genuine creativity seems to ground what humans are here for but where can it be found? They seem to be in conflict. While both Fromm and Kant ground human purpose in genuine creativity, they locate the source of freedom differently. Fromm seems to suggest freedom emerges in the world when external and internalized constraints are cleared away, allowing an innate, authentic spontaneity (like a child’s) to be released. Kant, however, suggests true freedom in ‘free art’ is achieved through mastering internal constraints or ‘mechanisms.’ It’s not about simply removing barriers, but about effectively realizing purpose and achieving a harmonious play of faculties within a necessary form. Clearly Fromm is interested mainly in the external and Kant in the internal but I guess I wonder how these connect given they take them in opposite directions kind of? There is still the bridge between external and internal for them here so don’t both need to be reconciling with each other? Is the child the pinnacle of mans expression? Is the man in the jail cell who still finds meaning a pinnacle of mans expression? Probably both? What does this mean? What am I even talking about? Honestly I don’t understand any of these guys, but there seems to be an interesting conversation going on here. If anyone has any thoughts let me know.

[jsalbato@cnm.edu]

oooh, yes, there is a dialogue here that needs to be heard.

I want to argue that we have here three different positive perspectives or goals of spontaneity. (And then, of course, there are the negative types of spontaneity, such as the drunk or the people who mistake their not being coerced as proof that they are free.)

Without being very rigorous here (I will not try to defend these word choices at all), we can call the three types “play”, “contrivance”, and “objectifying ideals”. In the first sense we have the child’s dancing. In the second sense we have the trained skills of the artisan. In the third sense we have the artist trying to approximate perfection (beauty, truth). I see Fromm as going back and forth between “play” and the Marxist “objectifying ideals”, while Kant is, maybe, speaking more about “contrivance”.

My question is whether all three types are necessarily free from alienation?

And note that I am dodging anything that requires an aesthetic mind to discuss. I am sticking to the ethical and psychological.

[Cole]

I think the third critique is trying to pave a way that reduces “alienation” of course for Kant this is more of a cognitive thing but I think it is related. By bridging the gap between determined nature and rational moral duty with reflective judgement, the objects form striking us as harmonious with our faculties we are presented with the feeling of belonging in the natural world, that our ideals may be realized. After looking up some Marx stuff I think Kant’s free art is fairly close to Marx objectifying ideals. I think that kant’s required inner mixing of aesthetic feeling and moral feeling is actually pretty correlate to Fromm’s integration of the total personality too. I think the mechanism is important as it relates to the formal nature of pure aesthetic judgement, this grounds universal communicability, and the demand for universal agreement in judgments of taste formally mirrors the universality demanded by the moral law. Both require transcending the purely personal and subjective viewpoint. Cultivating taste, with its inherent claim to universality, can thus be seen as promoting a disposition conducive to moral thought and feeling. Fromm on his Marx side seems to agree with this but the child seems maybe kinda Nietzschean? and a step in the opposite direction. But I do think it exists, but I kindof feel like its alienation raises us to a new level? I guess I want to say there is a kind of private language argument to the child that seems unfitting and its alienation (to Fromm) seems necessary for the vocation of man. But for Kant it would not be alienation because our spontaneity stems from the supersensible anyway? After more deliberation I think Kant and Fromm are closer than I originally was thinking, but where Kant is all in on the rational as the ends of man, Fromm seems to think there is something irrational that is key to our identity and free/spontaneous? I guess this is where the psychoanalytic stuff comes in? I think it’s implicit that to realize man’s moral/species ends require something like alienation from the form of spontaneity in the child/that identity and in this manner I think the artist and the child are different and I am curious as to how Fromm reconciles that. And I’m not trying to be a hater, I like the idea. It would seem to me society is a trade off, but I am interested in how Fromm tarries with that.

[jsalbato@cnm.edu]

Sounds like a good topic for a Master’s Thesis. I’m not kidding. At a school with a Kantian emphasis, they would love to see this.

The only observation I would make is that there seems to be some talking past on another (if we imagine these thinkers in dialogue) in terms of their goals. While admitting that Fromm is likely much less rigorous than Kant, I think they have different enemies. Kant is pushing against the irrationality and immorality of the society, while Fromm is pushing against the domination of the genuine self against the (psychological) immaturity of the self that is promoted by society and our own desire to avoid freedom.

This brings to mind your, later, dissertation topic: Is Kant protecting modern (and protestant?) rationality from postmodern irrationality?

[Cole]

Wow I’ll take that as a compliment. And yes I completely agree. They certainly have different goals. But in the above I think I wonder if there is any back end connection, or as someone who is reading both can we find a way to reconcile what we like from both. Kind of like your premise talk from the Singer video there is a great quote from whitehead somewhere about Descartes’ or maybe Spinoza’s philosophy not failing in that they botched their proofs but simply the gestalt or whole of their philosophy is missing something from our experience so in some respects we work within new boundary’s that create incomparability. In this sense I think Fromm and others grasp more than Kant and I am looking for a fusion of horizons that requires upholding both as potentially wrong and right.

I must admit I am not well versed enough in Kant’s ethics to say. I am not well versed in ethics and religious history in general and it shows. I have mostly been immersed in epistemology angle stuff but this is all getting interesting so I am starting to feel the pull to ethics. So, currently, I see Kant trying to protect certainty or correctness maybe truth? from subjectivity. Critique one makes universal laws valid (in possibility) but presents no hope for empirical particulars to be “actually” connected in empirical law/science/emprical concept. And my weak understanding is that the same follows for freedom and its concept of the highest good, as actually being realizable in our world. So, for me, the third critique has seemed like Kant realized he accidentally idealized himself outside his goals. In other words he saved objectivity and freedom in critiques 1 and 2 but the world disappeared in the Copernican turn. The third critique is trying to save the world hahaha. He needs a pineal gland like Descartes, and the third critique sometimes feels like that lol its pretty wacky but also genius.

What is the quickest way to get into Kant’s morals. Is groundwork pretty good? Or is do I really just have to swallow another critique/it makes the groundwork a waste of time. (the only experience I have of Kants morals is from forsters 25yrs phil which was pretty digestible the third critique summary in that book however still had me so lost I decided to dive in to the primary this month. Also anything to let me further procrastinate continuing reading Force and Understanding of the phenomenology )

[jsalbato@cnm.edu]

Yep, you really just have to dive into the “Groundwork”. The perk there is that, because Kant is such a careful writer, it is easy to find good lectures that explain the “Groundwork”. Now, of course, all of us are at a loss to defend strange false-negatives and false-positives when you apply his principles … (You can’t lie to a psycho-killer? No masturbation? I can’t take shortcut to work to avoid traffic?) … but this is another case that has parallels to what we are discussing above, that is, his ethical theory shows him, once again, going too far in trying to defend the modern against the postmodern. And, in this case, defending Christian morality against liberalism. And in some of these cases, Kant clearly fails.

Don’t get me wrong, I really admire Kant. I like him much more than the overall trajectory of postmodernism.

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